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Abstract 
We build on literature from policy and academic circles to assess if Latin America is leading 
when it comes to persistence in homicides. The focus is on a global sample of 163 countries 
for the period 2010 to 2015.  The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of 
Moments.  The following main finding is established. The region with the highest evidence of 
persistence in homicides is sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), followed by Latin America, the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) and then by Europe & Central Asia (ECA). In order to 
increase room for policy implications, the dataset is decomposed into income levels, religious 
domination, landlockedness and legal origins. From the conditioning information set, the 
following factors account for persistence in global homicides:  crime, political instability and 
weapons import positively affect homicides whereas the number of “security and police 
officers” has the opposite effect.  
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1. Introduction  
This inquiry is motivated by two main tendencies in scholarly and policy-making 
circles, namely: (i) the importance of understanding whether   Latin America is leading when 
it comes to persistence in homicides and what factors account for persistence in global 
homicides and (ii) gaps in non-specific Latin America literature. The two points are discussed 
in chronological order1.  
First, Muggah and de Carvalho (2017) report that a young Latin American is murdered 
every fifteen minutes. According to the narrative, the most murderous part of the world is 
Latin America which has registered about 2.5 million homicides since the year 2000, in spite 
of gains in education, poverty, health and overall improvements in living standards. It is 
important to note that Latin America is host to 23 of the 25 most murderous cities and 44 of 
the 50 most homicidal countries. Moreover, as global murder rates fall, Latin America is 
experiencing rising murder rates. To put the tendency into more perspective, it is projected 
that if the current trend is not interrupted, by 2035 the present murder rate of approximately 
22 per 100,000 people will rise to 35 per 100,000 people. Seven countries feature prominently 
in consolidating Latin America’s position in global homicides, namely: Venezuela, Mexico, 
Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia and Brazil. These countries account for about 
25% of world murders annually. In what follows, we substantiate the highlighted perspective 
with some country-specific literature.  
In spite of the recent public safety improvements, Colombia is still experiencing some 
of the highest absolute number of murders in the world. With about 60, 000 assassinations 
annually, Brazil is the country with the highest homicide rate. San Salvador has retained the 
title of the world’s murder capital for the second consecutive year: in 2016, its murder rate of 
136.7 per 100,000 residents was about seventeen times the world’s average. In a nutshell, 
Muggah and de Carvalho (2017) maintain that at least 33% of South and Central Americans 
are aware of somebody who has been murdered in the previous twelve months. 
Noticeably, the literature  documented by Muggah and de Carvalho (2017) leaves 
room for improvement in the perspective that, such tendencies should be substantiated with 
robust empirical studies in order to further inform policy markers of regions that are leading 
in global homicides.  Understanding dominant world regions in homicides is important 
because it guides in a number of national and international policies, inter alia: tourism and 
                                                 
1
 While this paper is positioned on studying whether Latin America is leading in terms of persistence in global 
homicides, the gap in the literature it aims of fill is more broad/global literature. This is our motivation for using 
a global dataset. 
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investment location decisions (Gibson, 2006; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014). This study aims to 
assess whether the underlying literature withstands empirical scrutiny using a global dataset 
that is decomposed into many fundamental characteristics, notably in terms of regions 
(consisting of Europe & Central Asia; East Asia & the Pacific; Middle East & North Africa; 
sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and North America).  
 Second, the positioning of this inquiry builds on the extant literature which has failed 
to assess whether Latin America is leading in the persistence of global homicides. Notably, 
recent studies include: the impact of homicides and economics on social and human biology 
(Bourne et al., 2015); a systematic review of the intimate partner homicide (Stöckl et al., 
2013); international cross-national perspectives on violence and homicides (Ouimet & 
Montmagny-Grenier, 2014; Cole & Gramajo, 2009); the nexus between age and homicide 
(Rogers, 2014); police performance and homicides rates (Pare, 2014); research challenges on 
the punishment of homicide in Europe (Liem & Campbell, 2014); the impacts of excess infant 
mortality, income inequality and  economic development on homicides (Ouimet, 2012); meta 
investigations on cross-national predictors of homicides (Nivette, 2011) and the nexus 
between inequality and homicide in developed countries (Jacobs & Richardson, 2008; 
Chamlin & Cochran, 2006).  
 This study complements the extant literature by attempting to answer the following 
question: is Latin America leading globally in the persistence of homicides? Therefore the 
hypothesis that Latin America is characterized by the highest degree of homicides in the 
world is tested. The theoretical basis for persistence in homicides fundamentally builds on the 
extant literature on convergence in development studies, notably: financial (Stephan & 
Tsapin, 2008; Goddard et al., 2011) and inclusive (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a) 
developments. Moreover, the theoretical foundations are consistent with mainstream literature 
on income levels which has been documented within the remit of neoclassical growth models 
(see  Barro, 1991; Barro  &  Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995;  Mankiw et al., 1992;  Baumol, 1986). 
Such underpinnings have been recently extended to other areas of development economics, 
notably: inclusive development (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; Asongu, 2014a), terrorism (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2018; Asongu et al., 2018a) and progress in financial markets (Narayan et al., 
2011; Bruno et al., 2012; Asongu, 2013).  
 Note should be taken of the fact that, in the period of post-Keynesianism, new theories 
of economic growth gained prominence owing to the rapid development of the neoclassical 
revolution which enhanced changes in cross-country income levels. Within this theoretical 
remit, the concepts of market equilibrium have been extended to emphasize the basis of 
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theories of economic development which estimated absolute decrease in income levels across 
countries. As maintained by Mayer-Foulkes (2010), such catch-up was largely traceable to 
conducive policies of “free market competition”. Conversely, seminal studies also concluded 
on the absence of convergence (or presence of divergence) and justified such conclusions 
with, inter alia: the likelihood of multiple equilibria and differences in initial endowments 
(see Barro, 1991; Pritchett, 1997). On the contrary, there is another strand of the theoretical 
literature which maintains that regardless of initial conditions, variations in cross-country 
income levels are likely to be established within the framework of countries’ steady state or 
long term equilibria (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a).  
 Noticeably from the above, the contending strands of the literature have a common 
denominator in the criteria with which convergence is apparent, notably: the interval in which 
the lagged endogenous variable should be situated for persistence in the dependent variable to 
be established. It is important to clarify that the aim of this inquiry is neither to take sides in 
either strands (or schools of thought) on the relevance of the convergence hypothesis. In 
essence, within the framework of persistence in homicide, contingent on fundamental 
characteristics and related sub-panels, the results of this paper may validate both schools of 
thought.  
 Building on the above theoretical underpinnings, this paper explores persistence in 
homicides using global data. The concept of persistence or hysteria in homicide is understood 
in terms of how past observations in homicide influence future observations in homicide. 
Empirically, this hypothesis of persistence is confirmed with a dynamic model in which 
estimated coefficients corresponding to the variable denoting non-contemporary observations 
significantly influence observations of the contemporary variable. An example of a dynamic 
empirical strategy that can be used to assess the underlying hypothesis is the Generalised 
Method of Moments. This empirical strategy is consistent with recent literature (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2018; Asongu et al., 2018a).  
The rest of the study is structured as follows. The data and methodology are discussed 
in Section 2 whereas Section 3 presents the empirical results, the corresponding discussion 
and implications. We conclude in Section 4 with future research directions.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data and background information 
We investigate a panel of one hundred and sixty three countries with data for the period 2010 
to 2015 from a plethora of sources, namely: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
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Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP); a Qualitative 
assessment by the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) analysts’ estimates; the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends; the Operations of Criminal 
Justice Systems (CTS) and the United Nations Committee on Contributions. The analysis is 
limited to 2010-2015 because of data availability constraints and the need to provided results 
with updated policy implications (Asongu, 2018). 
 The main dependent variable is the number of homicides (per 100,000 people). This 
intuitively reflects the prevalence of violence and deaths. The data on homicide is jointly from 
the UNODC, the CTS and EIU estimates. Indicators contained in the conditioning 
information set entail:  crime; security officers & police; political instability; weapons import; 
displaced persons and military expenditure. These indicators in the conditioning information 
set have been documented as determinants of conflicts, crimes and homicides (see Freytag et 
al., 2011; Blanco & Grier, 2009; GPI, 2016).  
 Consistent with the motivation of the study, other regions are used to assess if Latin 
America is leading, notably: South Asia; Europe & Central Asia; East Asia & the Pacific; 
Middle East & North Africa (MENA); sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); Latin America and North 
America. In order to improve room for policy implications, the dataset is further decomposed 
into fundamental characteristics based on: (i) income levels (High income, Upper middle 
income, Lower middle income and Low income); (ii) religious domination (Christian with 
Catholic domination;  Christian with Protestant inclination;  Christian countries in which 
another Christian religion apart from Catholicism and Protestantism is dominant;  Islam-
dominated countries and Buddhist-oriented countries); (iii) openness to sea (Landlocked and  
Coastal countries) and (iv) legal origins (English Common law, French Civil law, German 
civil law countries,  Scandinavian civil law countries and Socialists countries). In the narrative 
that follows, the information criteria for the selection of the fundamental features which is 
consistent with recent literature (D’Amico, 2010; Narayan et al., 2011; Beegle et al., 2016; 
Asongu & Le Roux, 2017;  Mlachila et al., 2016; Asongu et al., 2017) are discussed. 
The basis for classifying countries by legal origins is from La Porta et al. (2008, p. 
289) while the decomposition according to income levels is from the World Bank’s 
classification of income groups2.  The classification by religious-domination is from the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book (CIA, 2011) while landlocked countries 
are directly apparent on a world map.  
                                                 
2
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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While fundamental characteristics such as legal traditions and income levels are 
common in comparative development literature, it is important to provide the intuition 
motivating distinctions based on religion and landlockedness. First, consistent with recent 
literature (see Arvis et al., 2007; Asongu & Le Roux, 2017), economic and institutional costs 
are related to landlockedness. Such an institutional cost may be a higher propensity to 
political instability, violence and homicides. Second, the relevance of religious domination is 
in line with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017b) who have recently documented that Christian-
dominated countries are less (more) conservative (liberal) when compared with their Islam-
oriented counterparts. Consistent with the corresponding literature, within the framework of 
this study, we argue that a religion which is more liberal should be linked with more political 
instability (and by extension violence and homicides). This is essentially because liberal 
qualities such democracy and freedom of the press provide enabling conditions for citizens to 
voice their concerns through peaceful mechanisms that often turn violent compared to “stable 
autocratic” qualities which do not offer some avenues for the manifestation of grievances on 
the part of the population. Specific emphasis in put on the stability of autocracies (which is 
predominantly a feature of Islam-oriented countries) because, compared to their stable 
autocratic counterparts, violence and socio-economic unrests cannot be effectively controlled 
by failing and failed democratic states (see  Lai 2007; Piazza 2008). 
Details on the definitions of variables and corresponding sources as well as sampled 
countries can be found in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 provides the summary statistics. The 
correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 3. 
    
2.2 Methodology 
 The empirical strategy adopted in this study is the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) which is in accordance with the extant literature on the persistence of economic 
phenomena (see Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a; Doyle, 2017). In what follows, we discuss 
the five principal fundamentals motivating the choice of this empirical strategy. (i) The 
number of countries (163) is substantially higher than the number of periods in each cross 
section (6 years). (ii) The outcome variable is persistent because the correlation between 
homicides and its first lag is 0.988, which is higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800 
required for establishing persistence. (iii)  The GMM technique which uses a panel data 
structure does not eliminate cross-country variations. (iv) The estimation strategy takes 
endogeneity into account by accounting for simultaneity in the explanatory variables through 
an instrumentation process on the one hand and controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity 
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with time-invariant indicators on the other hand. (v) Inherent biases that are characteristic of 
the difference estimator are corrected with the system estimator. 
 Within the framework of this inquiry, the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) empirical strategy 
is adopted. This is an extension of the Arellano and Bover (1995) model. Consistent with 
recent literature, when compared to the traditional empirical approach (systems and difference 
GMM approaches), this strategy decreases over-identification (or the proliferation of 
instruments) and accounts for cross-sectional dependence (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 
2008; Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). 
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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is the number of homicides in country i
 
at  period t , 0  is a constant, 
 
W  is the 
vector of control variables (crime; security officers & police; political instability; weapons 
import; displaced persons and military expenditure),
 
 represents the coefficient of auto-
regression which is one for the specification, t
 
is the time-specific constant,
 
i
 
is the 
country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 It is important to substantiate the narrative with identification and exclusion 
restrictions which are indispensible for a good GMM specification. Identification refers to the 
choice of the dependent, endogenous explaining and strictly exogenous variables whereas 
exclusion restriction is the process by which the dependent variable is influenced by the 
strictly exogenous variables exclusively through the endogenous explaining variables. With 
respect to the exclusion restrictions, all explanatory indicators are defined as suspected 
endogenous or predetermined and only time invariant variables are considered to be strictly 
exogenous (see Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; Tchamyou, 2018). It is 
important to note that the selection and definition of time invariant indicators is consistent 
with Roodman (2009b) who has argued that it is not feasible for time invariant indicators to 
become endogenous after first difference3.   
                                                 
3
 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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 Concerning the exclusion restrictions, consistent with the identification process, the 
time invariant variables affect homicides exclusively through the suspected endogenous 
explaining (or predetermined or suspected endogenous) variables. Furthermore, the 
underlying exclusion restriction assumption is valid if and only if the null hypothesis 
corresponding to the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity is not 
rejected. Put in other words, the instruments (or strictly exogenous variables) need to explain 
the number of homicides exclusively through the selected channels or suspected endogenous 
variables. 
 In the findings that are reported in Section 3, the assumption of exclusion restriction is 
valid if the null hypothesis of the DHT that is linked to instrumental variables (IV) (year, 
eq(diff)) is not rejected. It is relevant to note that the underlying process of validating 
exclusion restrictions is similar to the standard IV procedure in which, failure to reject the null 
hypothesis corresponding to the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test implies that 
the strictly exogenous variables affect homicides exclusively through the suspected 
endogenous variable channels (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c). 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Presentation of results  
 The empirical results are disclosed in Table 1 and Table 2. While Table 1 presents 
findings on regions and legal origins, Table 2 discloses results corresponding to income 
levels, religious domination and landlockedness. For either table, the last column presents 
findings corresponding to the full sample.  Four main information criteria are used to examine 
the validity of the GMM models4. In the light of these criteria, most of the models are valid. 
However, it is relevant to also note that the validity of models is a necessary but not a 
sufficient for persistence in an outcome variable to be established. In what follows, we discuss 
these criteria. 
 In order for persistence to be established, the estimated lagged dependent variable has 
to be first of all significant and then meet the convergence criterion. The convergence 
                                                 
4
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments isalso employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
Also see Tchamyou and Asongu (2017). 
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criterion is that the absolute value of the lagged estimated homicide variable should be within 
the interval of zero and one. More insights into this criterion are apparent in recent catch-up 
literature (see Fung, 2009, p. 58; Asongu, 2013, p. 192). It is important to note that, in 
standard GMM reporting, the estimated coefficient corresponding to the outcome variable can 
be reported. Subsequently, one is subtracted from the coefficient to obtain beta (β= a-1), and 
the information criterion for convergence is that beta should be less than zero.  Moreover, the 
estimated lagged value of the dependent variable can still be directly reported. Within this 
alternative framework, the convergence criterion is that, the absolute value of the estimated 
lagged value falls within the interval of zero and one (see Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 
20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d, p. 459).  
 In the light of the above clarifications, the comparative criterion for establishing 
persistence is as follows: for two sub-samples, the sub-sample reflecting a higher estimated 
lagged value in the dependent variable is acknowledged to reflect more persistence. This is 
essentially because of the importance of magnitude in the estimated lagged value. 
Accordingly, such a magnitude is relevant in that it translates how past values of homicides 
are affecting future values of homicides. Therefore, from a comparative perspective, an 
estimated lagged value with a higher magnitude implies that past values more proportionately 
affect future values.  
 The following findings can be established from Table 1. The region with the highest 
evidence of persistence is SSA, followed by Latin America, the MENA and then by Europe & 
Central Asia. This finding implies that Latin America is not leading in terms of persistence in 
homicides. English common law countries experience less persistence in homicides when 
compared to their French civil law counterparts. Most of the significant control variables have 
the expected signs. Accordingly, crime, political instability and weapon imports are 
intuitively expected to be positively correlated with homicides whereas the opposite effect is 
expected from the number of security and police officers.  
  The following findings can be established from Table 2. Homicides are more 
persistent in low income countries (compared to high income countries). Such persistence is 
also more apparent in upper middle income countries, vis-à-vis their lower middle income 
counterparts. Murder is more persistent in Catholic-dominated Christian countries, followed 
by Islam-dominated, Buddhist-oriented and Presbyterian-dominated Christian nations. 
Homicides are less persistent in countries that are open to the sea when compared to their 
landlocked counterparts. Most of the significant control variables display the expected signs. 
Differences in estimated lagged coefficients between the full sample and the fundamental 
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characteristics justify the need to have disaggregated the dataset into sub-samples, notably: 
that blanket policies based on persistence from the full sample is unlikely to be effective 
unless they are contingent on fundamental characteristics and tailored differently across 
countries which belong to different regions, income groups, legal origins and religious 
domination.  
 
Table 1: Persistence in homicides with regions and legal origin dynamics  
              
 Dependent Variable: Homicides 
 Regions Legal origins Full 
 SA ECA EAP MENA SSA LA NA Eng. Frch. Ger. Scand. Social. Sample 
Constant  omitted 0.371 -0.722 0.019 0.219** -0.245 na 0.120 0.006 -1.309 na na -0.061 
  (0.271) (0.454) (0.877) (0.019) (0.353)  (0.177) (0.948) (0.350)   (0.605) 
Homicides (-1) 0.821*** 0.674*** 1.048*** 0.896*** 0.961*** 0.917***  0.934*** 0.969*** 1.001***   0.999*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)   (0.000) 
Crime 0.131 0.319*** 0.010 0.046** 0.00007 -0.021  0.017 0.083*** 0.282**   0.030 
 (0.427) (0.003) (0.851) (0.038) (0.998) (0.682)  (0.519) (0.002) (0.017)   (0.175) 
Security Officers 
& Police 
omitted -0.062 0.063 0.003 -
0.046*** 
0.015  -0.030 -0.021 -0.088   -0.011 
  (0.459) (0.201) (0.923) (0.000) (0.714)  (0.168) (0.341) (0.498)   (0.629) 
Political 
Instability 
-0.120 0.069 0.133** 0.005 0.007 0.194**  0.020 -0.013 0.016   0.018 
 (0.433) (0.123) (0.049) (0.891) (0.513) (0.010)  (0.338) (0.607) (0.890)   (0.509) 
Weapons import omitted -0.004 0.058 0.049** -0.008 0.091*  0.010 0.025 0.158   0.016 
  (0.884) (0.537) (0.025) (0.611) (0.061)  (0.599) (0.331) (0.112)   (0.349) 
Displaced 
persons  
0.060 0.024 0.021 -0.051* -0.023* 0.044**  -0.037* -0.029 0.158   -0.028 
 (0.373) (0.665) (0.904) (0.083) (0.054) (0.040)  (0.072) (0.282) (0.589)   (0.287) 
Military 
Expenditure  
0.084 -0.269** 0.005 -0.006 0.032* -0.002  0.043** -0.047* 0.271   -0.016 
 (0.412) (0.032) (0.955) (0.843) (0.061) (0.965)  (0.032) (0.070) (0.258)   (0.556) 
              
AR(1) (0.258) (0.014) (0.098) (0.035) (0.014) (0.016)  (0.010) (0.044) (0.079)   (0.003) 
AR(2) (0.715) (0.799) (0.100) (0.163) (0.154) (0.936)  (0.183) (0.996) (0.257)   (0.698) 
Sargan OIR (0.002) (0.003) (0.244) (0.003) (0.084) (0.142)  (0.045) (0.288) (0.021)   (0.003) 
Hansen OIR (1.000) (0.219) (0.996) (0.975) (0.412) (0.930)  (0.806) (0.340) (0.969)   (0.136) 
DHT for 
instruments 
(a)Instruments in 
levels 
             
H excluding 
group 
(1.000) (0.374) (0.735) (0.613) (0.228) (0.566)  (0.896) (0.308) (0.397)   (0.607) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(1.000) (0.200) (0.998) (0.986) (0.563) (0.946)  (0.576) (0.388) (0.998)   (0.081) 
(b) IV (years, eq 
(diff)) H 
excluding group 
(1.000) (0.200) (0.958) (0.988) (0.355) (0.662)  (0.726) (0.329) (0.969)   (0.296) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(1.000) (0.290) (1.000) (0.477) (0.511) (1.000)  (0.691) (0.393) (0.606)   (0.102) 
Fisher 5361.60 
*** 
55.72*** 1387.75 
*** 
555.55 
*** 
5531.67 
*** 
1863.33 
*** 
 510.20 
*** 
209.30 
*** 
112.81***   128.19 
*** 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31  31 31 31   31 
Countries  8 48 18 20 44 23  50 87 20   163 
Observations  40 240 90 100 220 115  250 435 100   815 
              
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. Eng: 
English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law countries. Social: Socialists 
countries.  ECA: Europe & Central Asia. EAP: East Asia & the Pacific. MENA: Middle East & North Africa. SSA: sub-Saharan Africa. LA: Latin America. NA: 
North America. Eng: English Common Law countries. Frch: French Civil Law countries. Ger: German Civil law countries. Scand: Scandinavian Civil law 
countries. Social: Socialists countries.  na: not applicable because of  issues in degrees of freedom.  
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Table 2: Persistence in homicides with income levels, religious domination and landlockedness  
             
 Dependent Variable: Homicides 
             
 Income Levels Religious Domination Openness to sea Full 
 HI UMI LMI LI CC CP CO Islam Bhu LL NLL Sample 
Constant  0.520*** 0.105 0.355*** 0.220* -0.128 0.588** 1.191 0.003 0.400 0.385**
* 
-0.129* -0.061 
 (0.000) (0.433) (0.003) (0.073) (0.191) (0.028) (0.210) (0.975) (0.621) (0.001) (0.098) (0.605) 
Homicides  (-1) 0.913*** 0.976*** 0.904*** 0.920*** 0.997*** 0.719*** 0.495 0.941*** 0.764*** 0.877**
* 
0.999**
* 
0.999*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.201) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crime -0.006 0.008 0.008 0.095*** 0.00004 0.098 0.506 0.004 0.610 0.075 0.023 0.030 
 (0.818) (0.715) (0.588) (0.005) (0.999) (0.157) (0.404) (0.789) (0.216) (0.290) (0.175) (0.175) 
Security Officers & 
Police 
-0.142*** -0.016 0.017 -
0.078*** 
0.025 -
0.144*** 
0.067 0.011 -0.096 -
0.162**
* 
0.004 -0.011 
 (0.000) (0.520) (0.374) (0.002) (0.234) (0.004) (0.712) (0.371) (0.526) (0.000) (0.823) (0.629) 
Political Instability 0.167*** 0.002 -0.016 -0.014 0.049** 0.130** -0.421 0.040 -0.400 0.071 0.016 0.018 
 (0.000) (0.895) (0.426) (0.287) (0.041) (0.027) (0.111) (0.113) (0.358) (0.250) (0.505) (0.509) 
Weapons import -0.002 0.032 -
0.108*** 
0.003 0.001 -0.055 -0.040 0.030** 0.016 0.001 0.018 0.016 
 (0.820) (0.289) (0.001) (0.947) (0.933) (0.238) (0.810) (0.020) (0.902) (0.969) (0.180) (0.349) 
Displaced persons  -0.197*** -0.019 0.064*** -
0.070*** 
-0.005 -
0.143*** 
-0.194 -0.028* -0.295 -
0.098**
* 
-0.014 -0.028 
 (0.000) (0.271) (0.002) (0.005) (0.744) (0.009) (0.354) (0.092) (0.282) (0.003) (0.484) (0.287) 
Military Expenditure  -0.009 -0.009 -0.039 0.021 -0.026 0.195*** -0.037 -0.023* 0.228 0.051** -0.008 -0.016 
 (0.781) (0.492) (0.131) (0.328) (0.153) (0.009) (0.877) (0.064) (0.623) (0.044) (0.691) (0.556) 
             
AR(1) (0.083) (0.000) (0.082) (0.155) (0.001) (0.103) (0.250) (0.112) (0.147) (0.041) (0.008) (0.003) 
AR(2) (0.446) (0.709) (0.351) (0.161) (0.093) (0.732) (0.225) (0.540) (0.327) (0.482) (0.180) (0.698) 
Sargan OIR (0.052) (0.158) (0.009) (0.746) (0.155) (0.001) (0.519) (0.220) (0.001) (0.197) (0.201) (0.003) 
Hansen OIR (0.557) (0.884) (0.389) (0.486) (0.201) (0.697) (1.000) (0.420) (1.000) (0.712) (0.340) (0.136) 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in 
levels 
            
H excluding group (0.855) (0.406) (0.353) (0.424) (0.495) (0.613) (0.995) (0.184) (0.915) (0.870) (0.378) (0.607) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.316) (0.950) (0.416) (0.487) (0.140) (0.618) (1.000) (0.630) (1.000) (0.473) (0.338) (0.081) 
(b) IV (years, eq 
(diff)) H excluding 
group 
(0.351) (0.776) (0.693) (0.336) (0.497) (0.463) (1.000) (0.388) (1.000) (0.536) (0.713) (0.296) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.911) (0.848) (0.082) (0.777) (0.050) (0.969) (1.000) (0.452) (0.956) (0.861) (0.052) (0.102) 
Fisher 303.29*** 3593.46 
*** 
234.70**
* 
154.17**
* 
1895.46*
** 
190.48**
* 
15.46*** 381.50**
* 
160.86**
* 
5957.21
*** 
360.96*
** 
128.19 
*** 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Countries  43 36 46 38 54 26 14 49 13 34 129 163 
Observations  215 180 230 190 270 130 70 245 65 170 645 815 
             
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. HI: 
High Income countries. UMI: Upper Middle Income countries. LMI: Lower Middle Income countries. LI: Low Income countries. CC: Christian countries with 
Catholic domination. CP: Christian countries with Protestant domination. CO: Christian countries in which another Christian religion apart from Catholicism and 
Protestantism is dominant. Islam: Islam-dominated countries.  Bhu: Buddhism dominated countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not Landlocked countries.  
 
 
 
3.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications 
3.2.1 Further discussion of results  
In this section, we provide clarifications to the tendencies established in the findings. 
This discussion is engaged in two main strands, notably: (i) why SSA and not Latin America 
is leading in homicides in the world and (ii) clarifications to the other comparative results.  
First, though literature supports the position that Latin America is the region in the 
world with the highest rate of homicides, persistence in the phenomenon reflects a relatively 
different tendency. Accordingly, in the former, a situational picture of homicides is presented 
at a given point in time whereas the latter reflects how past observations of homicides 
influence future observations of the phenomena: the hysteria hypothesis. We have established 
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that such a hypothesis is more apparent in SSA. It is important to note that the more persistent 
role of SSA is contingent on the variables employed in the conditioning information set. 
Accordingly, persistence is contingent on variations in factors that affect homicides. Hence, 
the findings are relative to control variables adopted in the conditioning information set.  
Another possible explanation is that SSA is comparatively poorer. Consistent with 
intuition, regions that are dominated by low income nations should be associated with higher 
levels of persistence in crimes, probably because of limited financial resources needed to 
address and prevent conflicts and homicides. The intuition has been used to motivate recent 
literature on the need for development assistance to reduce the negative impacts of terrorism 
on poor countries (see Efobi et al., 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017).  
 It is also important to substantiate the above narratives with the fact that compared to 
Latin American countries; SSA has been characterized by more political instability and 
violence, which are natural determinants of homicides. Hence, some of the variables 
employed in the conditioning information set that influence that comparative evidence of 
persistence in homicides may be more apparent in SSA, namely: weapon imports, political 
instability and military expenditure. The relative importance of SSA in political instability and 
violence is summarized by Asongu (2014b): “seven of the nine cases of total chaos and 
societal breakdowns known in recent history have been registered in Africa (with the 
exceptions of Afghanistan and Syria): Angola, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zaire/Congo, 
Somalia, and Sudan” (p.1569).  
 A possible reason why “Europe & Central Asia” is the region with the lowest rate of 
persistence in homicides is because of its relatively high propensity to resolve homicide cases. 
As substantiated by Muggah and de Carvalho (2017), compared to Latin America where only 
about 20% of homicides cases are resolved, in European and North American countries, the 
corresponding rate is approximately 80%. In this light, life is cheaper in one region than in the 
other. This is essentially because peoples’ belief in the justice system determines whether they 
take laws into their own hands or not. Hence, when peoples’ faith in the criminal justice 
system and policing has plummeted on the one hand and on the other hand, when the cost of 
murder is low, people may decide to resort to the swift option of murder instead of the 
protracted option of  gaining justice through courts and law enforcement. 
Second, in the light of the clarifications provided in the preceding strand, the 
comparative advantages in the other fundamental characteristics (income levels, legal origins, 
openness to sea and religious domination) are contingent on the relative importance of the 
variables in the conditioning information set within the fundamental characteristics. For 
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instance, the relative importance of persistence in homicides in French civil law countries 
may be explained by the fact that the English common law system is more flexible in adapting 
to changing and evolving conditions (see La Porta et al.,1998, 1999; Beck et al., 2003; Agbor, 
2015). Hence, the English common law system could more easily provide enabling legal and 
economic conditions that mitigate the hysteria hypothesis in homicides, notably: past 
observations in homicides influencing future observations in homicides. Looking at SSA 
where such persistence is most apparent, we can substantiate this perspective with the fact the 
variables used in the conditioning information set are more apparent in French civil law 
countries in the sub-region vis-à-vis their English common law counterparts.  For example, in 
the post-colonial era, as of 2014, former French colonies had registered more than half of all 
documented political coup d’états in Africa, notably: 45 versus 22 for English common law 
countries (Koutonin, 2014). Accordingly, such political coup d’états are logically associated 
with political instability and violence.  
 
3.2.2 Implications for public spending  
 It is important for governments to manage persistence in homicides because of a 
plethora of reasons, notably: foreign direct investment and tourism location decisions are very 
likely to be affected by murder tendencies. In other words, foreign direct investment can be 
negatively affected and the tourism industry can also decline because of depressing business 
activity due to risks linked to public travel. Accordingly, the wound culture theory (which 
builds on risk aversion due to a high perception/probability of murder) may explain typically 
serial murder tourism activity which entails dining, refreshments, photo-opportunities, 
refreshments and acquisition of souvenirs. It is to prevent panic and manifestation of such 
behavior that public responses to homicides is important. Hence, public spending in curbing 
serial murder is vital. Moreover, there are unappealing and unproductive consequences such 
as lost productivity and unproductive spending which are related to premature death. Social 
spending is also undermined since more spending is allocated to the pursuit of criminals 
involved in murders. The underlying issues can be remedied by managing public spending 
more efficiently as well as focusing on the right areas.  
 With respect to areas of investment, governments have often thought that addressing 
the problem of homicides will entail investing more money in security and police forces, 
building more prisons and enforcing judicial decisions. For instance, as substantiated by 
Muggah and de Carvalho (2017), between fifty-five and seventy billion USD is being spent 
on public security annually in Latin America. This amount is just about a third of the total 
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amount spent on both education and health across the regions. Moreover, there has also been 
an increase of 116% in mass incarcerations between 1995 and 2012.  
With respect to efficiency in investment, smarter solutions can involve focusing on a 
few logical strategies. (i) It is relevant for businesses, government and groups in civil society 
to adopt data-driven interventions and evidence-based strategies which can focus on hot 
people and hot spots. This recommendation is based on the intuition that violent crime is 
characterized by hysteria such that it is often concentrated in, inter alia:  specific 
neighborhoods, certain periods during the day, the less educated, poor neighborhoods and 
younger factions of the population. (ii) Efforts towards reducing and preventing murder 
should also entail joint efforts aimed at repairing strained relations between the community 
and the police in regions that are most affected by violence. This is essentially because low 
trust in police officers breeds more homicides. (iii) Law and order can also be enhanced by 
improving how prosecution and investigation of homicides are carried out. Moreover, 
policing that is more oriented towards a problem-oriented approach can reduce homicides, 
especially when it comes to international homicides and gang-oriented crimes. (iv) Prevention 
can be improved by focusing on some factors that are crucial in motivating crimes and 
violence, namely: age, level of income and educational attainment.  
 
 
4. Conclusion, caveats and future research directions  
This study has built on literature from policy and academic circles to assess if Latin America 
is leading when it comes to persistence in homicides across the world. The focus is on a 
global sample of 163 countries for the period 2010 to 2015.  The empirical evidence is based 
on Generalised Method of Moments.  The following main finding is established. The region 
with the highest evidence of persistence is sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Latin America, 
the MENA and then by Europe & Central Asia (ECA). This finding implies that Latin 
America is not leading in terms of persistence in homicides. In order to increase room for 
policy implications, the dataset has been decomposed into income levels, religious 
domination, landlockedness and legal origins. (i) English common law countries experience 
less persistence in homicides when compared to their French civil law counterparts.  (ii) 
Homicides are more persistent in low income countries (compared to higher income 
countries). Such persistence is also more apparent in upper middle income countries, vis-à-vis 
their lower middle income counterparts. (iii) Homicides are more persistent in Catholic-
dominated Christian countries, followed by Islam-dominated, Buddhist-oriented and 
16 
 
Presbyterian-dominated Christian nations.  (iv) Homicides are less persistent in coastal 
countries when compared to their landlocked counterparts. (v) From the conditioning 
information set, crime, political instability and weapons import are positively correlated with 
homicides whereas the opposite effect is apparent from the number of security and police 
officers. Justifications for the established tendencies and policy implications have been 
discussed.  It is relevant for policy makers to decrease and improve established factors (in the 
conditioning information set) that respectively increase and decrease persistence in homicides. 
The underlying factors are contingent on the engaged comparative fundamental 
characteristics.  
 As a caveat, it is important to note that evidence of persistence is contingent on the 
variables employed in the conditioning information set. Hence, the tendencies depend on the 
control variables that are selected and involved in the modeling exercise. We have observed 
that most of the control variables are significant with the expected signs. Moreover, studies in 
the literature are based on comparatively less control variables. For instance, Bruno et al. 
(2012) have exclusively used two control variables. Hence the findings are also contingent on 
some determinants of homicides not included in the study, notably: income inequality, civil 
wars, youth bulges, urban population and democracy. Given the relevance of sub-Saharan 
Africa in the analysis, it is important to note that the inclusion of political instability is not a 
substitute to civil war. In summary, the analysis and corresponding policy implications are 
contingent on the variables used in the conditioning information set. This is a fundamental 
shortcoming in conditional (or contingent) convergence (or persistence) modeling by means 
of the Generalised Method of Moments.  
Future research can focus on assessing whether the established findings withstand 
empirical scrutiny within country-specific frameworks. Such research is necessary for more 
focused and targeted country-specific policy implications.  
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Appendices  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
  
Variables  Definition and sources of variables   
  
Displaced people  Number of refugees and internally displaced people 
as a percentage of the population 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Mid-Year Trends; 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 
  
Political instability  Political instability 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Homicides  Number of homicides per 100,000 people 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates 
  
Violent crime  Level of violent crime 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Incarceration  Number of jailed population per 100,000 people 
World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex 
  
Security Officers & Police Number of internal security officers and police 
per 100,000 people UNODC; EIU estimates 
  
  
Military expenditure  Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
The Military Balance, IISS 
  
Weapon imports  Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons 
as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers 
Database 
  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).  The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The  Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU). United Nations Peacekeeping Funding (UNPKF). GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics and countries  
      
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Homicides  2.797 1.154 1.103 5.000 978   
      
Incarcerations 2.194 0.889 1.150 5.000 978    
      
Political instability  2.545 1.030 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Displaced people  1.348 0.872 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Violent crime  2.768 1.136 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Security Officers & Police 2.728 0.911 1.081 5.000 978 
      
Military expenditure  1.966 0.824 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Weapon imports  1.489 0.868 1.000 5.000 978   
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Panel B: Sampled countries (163) 
      
Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d' Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; 
Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; 
Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; 
Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; 
Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; North Korea; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palestine; Panama; Papua New 
Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the Congo; Romania; Russia; 
Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; 
South Korea; South Sudan; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden;Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; Tajikistan; 
Tanzania; Thailand; The Gambia; Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; 
Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; 
Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
      
      
Standard dev: Standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.  
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 978) 
         
Pol. Insta. Displ. P. Crime S O & P Military W. Imports Homicides Incarcerations  
1.000 0.336 0.479 0.042 0.336 -0.238 0.236 -0.140 Pol. Insta. 
 1.000 0.235 0.036 0.291 -0.058 0.035 -0.105 Displ. P 
  1.000 -0.122 -0.027 -0.386 0.585 -0.116 Crime 
   1.000 0.215 0.140 -0.022 0.279 S O & P 
    1.000 0.236 -0.098 0.093 Military  
     1.000 -0.325 0.044 W. Imports 
      1.000 0.161 Homicides 
       1.000 Incarcerations  
         
Pol. Insta: Political Instability. Displ. P: Displaced Persons. Crime: Violent crime. S O & P: Security Officers & 
Police. Military: Military Expenditure. W. Imports: Weapons Imports.  
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